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RECENT CASES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- EQUAL PROTECTION- FOURTH CIRCUIT 
FINDS UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MINORITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.- Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d I47 {4th Cir. 
!994). 
The use of minority scholarships to create a diverse student body 
and to remedy past discrimination has been the subject of considerable 
controversy in recent years.1 Although such scholarships constitute a 
small percentage of financial aid for higher education, 2 opponents of 
minority scholarships argue that they unfairly discriminate against 
non-minority students on the basis of race.3 In Podberesky v. Kir-
wan,4 the Fourth Circuit held that the University of Maryland at Col-
lege Park (UMCP) denied Daniel Podberesky, a Hispanic/white 
student, equal protection of the laws by excluding him from considera-
tion for the race-based Benjamin Banneker Scholarship Program. The 
program, the court held, was not narrowly tailored to remedy past dis-
crimination at the University.5 In its analysis, however, the court ap-
plied only a portion of the applicable legal standard. A proper 
analysis of the program using the factors set forth in United States v. 
Paradise6 would have demonstrated that the program was narrowly 
tailored to address the racial problems of the University. 
In the fall of I990, Daniel Podberesky applied for a Benjamin Ban-
neker scholarship, a merit-based scholarship awarded to Mrican 
American students at UMCP. The University did not consider him for 
a scholarship, because he is not African American. Podberesky filed 
suit in federal district court, challenging the Banneker program at 
UMCP as a violation of Title VI and 42 U.S.C. §§ I98I and I983.7 
Based on a historical record that made it "abundantly clear that there 
is a history of past discrimination at UMCP,"8 the district court 
granted summary judgment to UMCP, because it found that there ex-
isted sufficient evidence of present effects of past discrimination to 
1 See U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: INFORMATION ON MINORITY-
TARGETED SCHOLARSHIPS I (I994). 
2 See id. 
3 See Mary Jordan, Minority Scholarship Rules Relaxed, WASH. PoST, Feb. IS, I994, at AI6. 
4 38 F.3d I47 (4th Cir. I994). 
5 See id. at I6I. 
6 480 U.S. I49 (1987). 
7 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 366, 368 (D. Md. I99I); Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Podberesky, 38 F.3d I47 (No. 93-2527). Because Title VI is coex-
tensive with the Equal Protection Clause, see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 
582, 6Io-IX (I983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment), the district court considered whether 
the program denied Podberesky equal protection of the Jaws. The court ruled against Podberesky 
on the §§ I98I and 1983 claims. See Podberesky, 764 F. Supp. at 376-77-
8 Podberesky, 764 F. Supp. at 372. 
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merit an affirmative action program and that the program was nar-
rowly tailored to "serve[ ] the compelling interest of remedying" those 
present effects. 9 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded 
for findings of fact on the existence of present effects of past discrimi-
nation at UMCP.10 On remand, the district court upheld the Ban-
neker program as constitutional.11 The district court found that a long 
history of pervasive discrimination at the University12 resulted in four 
present effects of discrimination: the University's poor reputation in 
the Mrican American community, the present perception of a hostile 
campus climate for Mrican American students, underrepresentation of 
Mrican Americans in the student body, and a disproportionately high 
attrition rate among Mrican American students.13 
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed.14 Judge Wid-
ener, writing for the panel, ruled that the district court erred in find-
ing that "the University had sufficient evidence of present effects of 
past discrimination to justify the program" and in finding that the pro-
gram was narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives.15 The court en-
tered judgment in favor of Podberesky, because it found that the 
program was not narrowly tailored to achieve its goals.16 The Fourth 
Circuit rejected the .district court's findings of four present effects of 
past discrimination, concluding that they were either insufficient as a 
matter of law or insufficiently demonstrated as a matter of fact. First, 
the court stated that neither the University's poor reputation in the 
Mrican American community nor the perception of racial hostility on 
campus was "sufficient, standing alone, to justify the single-race Ban-
neker Program."17 Judge Widener also rejected the district court's res-
olution of factual disputes concerning the underrepresentation and 
high attrition rates of Mrican American students on summary 
judgment.18 
The .court next found that even if it was "assumed that the Univer-
sity had demonstrated that blacks were underrepresented at the Uni-
versity and that the higher attrition rate was related to past 
discrimination," the Banneker program was not narrowly tailored to 
remedy these problems.19 The court based this holding on four find-
9 Id. at 375. 
10 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1992). 
11 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1099 (D. Md. 1993). 
12 The court identified several manifestations of this pervasive discrimination. See id. at 
1077-80. 
13 See id. at 1084-94. 
14 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Judges Wilkins and Hamilton 
joined in Judge Widener's opinion. 
15 Id. at rs1. 
16 See id. at r61. 
17 Id. at IS4· 
18 See id. at ISS-57· 
19 Id. at IS7-S8. 
1995] RECENT CASES 1775 
ings. First, because "[h]igh achievers, whether African-American or 
not, are not the group against which the University discriminated in 
the past,"20 the court rejected the argument that a program that at-
tempted to attract "high achieving" blacks to UMCP was narrowly tai-
lored.21 Second, because Banneker scholarships were awarded to non-
Maryland residents, the program was not narrowly tailored to increase 
the representation or decrease the attrition rate of "qualified Mclean-
American high school students in Maryland," which was the group the 
University had identified as the relevant reference pool.22 Third, the 
court criticized the district court for employing an arbitrary reference 
pool to determine the extent of underrepresentation at UMCP.23 Fi-
nally, the court found that the University had not shown that it had 
attempted race-neutral solutions to remedy the lower retention rate of 
black students. 24 
The Fourth Circuit applied only a portion of the proper legal stan-
dard to the Banneker program to determine if the program was nar-
rowly tailored.25 Judge Widener analyzed the program according to 
the factors that the Supreme Court reviewed in City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co.,26 but noted that the program could not withstand the 
20 ld. at I58. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. at 159 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 See id. 
24 See id. at r6r. 
25 The court also made several errors in its analysis of the program. The court's reasoning in 
rejecting the hostile-climate justification - that many universities in the North and the South 
could make similar claims - was a non sequitur. Judge Widener reasoned that such pervasive 
discrimination is "societal discrimination, which cannot be used as a basis for supporting a race-
conscious remedy." ld. at I55· However, if universities discriminate against African Americans, 
their discrimination may be part of a larger pattern of societal discrimination. This possibility 
neither lessens nor excuses the insidiousness of each individual university's past actions or the 
present effects of that past discrimination such that affirmative action at the individual universi-
ties is unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Podberesky court's result is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's prior decisions, including City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989). Although the Court has cautioned against programs ainied at remedying broad percep-
tions of societal discrimination, see, e.g., id. at 498-500, Croson clearly states that "[n]othing we 
say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to rectify the effects of identified 
discrimination within its jurisdiction." ld. at 509 (emphasis added). 
In addition, although the Podberesky court claimed that the program could not be narrowly 
tailored because it was designed to attract "high achieving" African Americans, if the University 
discriminated against African Americans, the fact that it did not single out "high achieving" Afri-
can Americans for additional or heightened discrimination is irrelevant. As African Americans, 
the "high-achievers" are members of the group against which the University discriminated previ-
ously, and as such, are entitled to the benefits of the University's remedial actions. The Supreme 
Court has expressly rejected the idea that an affirmative action plan is invalid if it benefits those 
who were not the identified victims of discrimination. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l 
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986). 
26 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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test announced in United States v. ParadiseP In explaining why it 
would consider only the factors discussed in Croson, and not those set 
out in Paradise, the court emphasized two points. First, unlike the 
fifty-percent promotional requirement at issue in Paradise, the Ban-
neker scholarship did not require racial quotas. 28 Second, in contrast 
to Paradise, both Croson and Podberesky dealt with claims involving 
present effects of past discrimination.29 However, Paradise did in-
volve a racial quota to remedy the present effects of past discrimina-
tion.30 Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not revise or abandon the 
Paradise standard in Croson;31 rather, the Court limited itself to "two 
observations" on the issue whether the promotional requirement was 
narrowly tailored, because the plan in Croson was not connected to 
"identified discrimination in any way."32 Therefore, the Supreme 
Court did not conduct a full "narrowly tailored" analysis in Croson. 
Such an analysis, the Court explained, would be "almost impossible," 
because the City of Richmond had failed to demonstrate discrimina-
tion and thus lacked a compelling interest to justify the program.33 
Thus, the Court's ultimate holding in Croson was based on a lack of a 
compelling state interest;34 the "two observations" of the Court were 
merely dicta. 
To determine if the program was narrowly tailored, the Podberesky 
court should have examined the factors announced in Paradise, which 
encompass the factors analyzed in Croson. Under Paradise, a court 
should consider "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alterna-
tive remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief[;] . . . the rela-
tionship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the 
impact of the relief on the rights of third parties" to determine if an 
affirmative action program is narrowly tailored.35 Had the Podberesky 
court properly applied Paradise, it would have held that the program 
was narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of past 
discrimination. 
The Banneker program was a necessary component of the Univer-
sity's efforts to remedy the present effects of past discrimination at 
UMCP. Title VI regulations require a recipient of federal funding to 
27 4So U.S. 149 (19S7); see Podberesky, 3S F.3d at ISS n.Io. The Fourth Circuit previously 
applied the Paradise test in Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 
216 (4th Cii. 1993). 
28 See Podberesky, 3S F.3d at xss n.Io. 
29 See id. 
30 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at IS4-SS. 
31 See Croson, 488 U.S. at so7. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at sos-o7. 
34 See id. at sos, S 11. 
35 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. Like the panel's opinion, this Recent Case assumes a statisti· 
cally significant disparity exists and that the disparity is related to past discrimination. See 
Podberesky, 3S F.3d at IS7-sS. 
1995] RECENT CASES 1777 
"take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimina-
tion."36 The University's history of discrimination and segregation cre-
ated barriers to the creation of a fully integrated system of higher 
education.37 Prior to the program's institution, the state had made re-
peated attempts to comply with Title VI. The final plan that was ap-
proved by the Office of Civil Rights "included specific reliance on the 
... Banneker Scholarship Program. "38 Without such a program, many 
minorities may have been unwilling or financially unable to attend the 
University.39 The Banneker program addressed these barriers at 
UMCP.40 
Moreover, race-neutral remedies would neither have effectively ad-
dressed the present effects of past discrimination at UMCP nor sub-
stantially furthered the University's diversity goals. The University's 
attempts at both a race-blind merit-based scholarship program and a 
race-neutral need-based scholarship program had already failed to re-
cruit black students in significant numbers.41 Additionally, race-neu-
tral efforts would not have ad<l:ressed several factors that deterred 
black students from attending UMCP, including the perception of ra-
cial hostility and the poor reputation of the University within Mrican 
American communities. Furthermore, alternative remedies would not 
have effectively furthered the University's diversity goals.42 Although 
racial diversity is only one aspect of creating a diverse student body, 
"it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a 
racially neutral way and have it successful. "43 
In addition, the Banneker program was flexible and of limited du-
ration. It was reevaluated at least every three years,44 which ensured 
that its minimal burden would be imposed only so long as it was nec-
essary to mitigate persisting problems. This periodic reevaluation in-
creased the program's flexibility, because it allowed administrators to 
alter or eliminate the program if it proved no longer necessary. 
The University also established the proper relationship between the 
Banneker program's goals and the relevant student population. The 
program's goals must have been designed to address the under-
36 34 C.F.R § 100.3(b){6)(i) (1994). The regulations also permit universities to undertake vol-
untary affirmative action programs to overcome the continuing effects of factors that contributed 
to the underrepresentation of minority groups. See id. § 100.3(b)(6)(ii). 
37 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075. 1084-94 oi Md. 1993). 
38 Id. at 1081. 
39 Several university officials have commented that a university may have difficulty recruiting 
minority students without financial aid specifically designated for such students. See Nondiscrim-
ination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8761 (1994). 
40 See Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at 1094. 
4l See id. at 1095. · 
42 The Supreme Court recognized the importance of a diverse student body in Regents of the 
Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3II-12 (1978). 
43 Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
44 See Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at 1082. 
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representation and attrition rates of black students, rather than an al-
ternative racial disparity.45 The program was so designed - among 
other things, it attempted to attract more African Americans to UMCP 
and to reduce the attrition rate of those Mrican Americans who had 
chosen to attend the University.46 To remedy these problems, the Uni-
versity provided Banneker scholarships to twenty to thirty black stu-
dents in each entering class of approximately 3100 total students -
less than one percent of the entering class.47 This relationship was 
analogous to similar relationships that have been approved as constitu-
tionally permissible.48 The provision of Banneker scholarships was di-
rectly related to remedying the proper disparities. 
Finally, the program imposed a minimal burden upon third par-
ties.49 The program was not administered "to affirmatively admit Af-
rican-American students solely on the basis of race.nso Rather, 
Banneker scholarships were presented after admissions decisions had 
been completed, and therefore, did not affect the admission of any stu-
dent- Mrican American or otherwise.51 Furthermore, the funds for 
the Banneker Scholarship program represented just one percent of the 
University's total financial aid budget;52 therefore, all students com-
peted for the overwhelming majority of University financial aid. 
As opposition to affirmative action continues to grow, the Fourth 
Circuit, among others, would overlook the pervasive effects of past 
discrimination. However, the effects of centuries of economic and edu-
cational deprivation continue to disadvantage many blacks who at-
tempt to pursue economic and educational opportunities. The 
elimination of race-conscious means today will only exacerbate the 
deep chasms that presently exist between the races.53 
45 Compare United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, r7g-8o (1987) (upholding a promotional 
requirement, in part because the requirement's minority representation goal reflected the percent-
age of blacks in the applicable labor market) with Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 
294 (r986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the 
school board's minority representation goal for teachers was impermissibly tied to "the percentage 
of minority students in the school district," rather than "the percentage of qualified minority 
teachers within the relevant labor pool"). 
46 See Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at ro87-89, 109I. 
47 See id. at ro96. 
48 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 86r F. Supp. 551, 575 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (explaining that the 
proper relationship was "easily satisfied" by the University of Texas School of Law's admissions 
goals, which were based on the "percentages of black and Mexican American college graduates in 
the State of Texas"). 
49 The Supreme Court has recogni2ed that remedying this country's history of discrimination 
may require innocent parties to bear some of the burden. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 28o-8r. 
50 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, r6o (4th Cir. 1994). 
51 See Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at 1096. 
52 See id. at ro77. 
53 See, e.g., CORNEL WEST, RACE MATIERS 95 (1994) ("Given the history of this country, it is 
a virtual certainty that without affirmative action, racial and sexual discrimination would return 
with a vengeance."). 
